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Abstract
Background: The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control makes a number of recommendations aimed at restricting
the marketing of tobacco products. Tobacco industry political activity has been identified as an obstacle to Parties’
development and implementation of these provisions. This study systematically reviews the existing literature on tobacco
industry efforts to influence marketing regulations and develops taxonomies of 1) industry strategies and tactics and 2)
industry frames and arguments.
Methods: Searches were conducted between April-July 2011, and updated in March 2013. Articles were included if they
made reference to tobacco industry efforts to influence marketing regulations; supported claims with verifiable evidence;
were written in English; and concerned the period 1990–2013. 48 articles met the review criteria. Narrative synthesis was
used to combine the evidence.
Results: 56% of articles focused on activity in North America, Europe or Australasia, the rest focusing on Asia (17%), South
America, Africa or transnational activity. Six main political strategies and four main frames were identified. The tobacco
industry frequently claims that the proposed policy will have negative unintended consequences, that there are legal
barriers to regulation, and that the regulation is unnecessary because, for example, industry does not market to youth or
adheres to a voluntary code. The industry primarily conveys these arguments through direct and indirect lobbying, the
promotion of voluntary codes and alternative policies, and the formation of alliances with other industrial sectors. The
majority of tactics and arguments were used in multiple jurisdictions.
Conclusions: Tobacco industry political activity is far more diverse than suggested by existing taxonomies of corporate
political activity. Tactics and arguments are repeated across jurisdictions, suggesting that the taxonomies of industry tactics
and arguments developed in this paper are generalisable to multiple jurisdictions and can be used to predict industry
activity.
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Background
The public availability of internal tobacco industry (TI)
documents resulting from state-level litigation and the signing of
the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) in the USA has formed
the basis of an extensive body of work on TI political activity (see
[2] for overview). These studies have greatly expanded our
understanding of the scope of TI political activity, but they tend to
be event or case-study based. While the focused nature of these
studies provides potentially valuable detail of the political strategies
used by large tobacco companies, they do not draw out the
broader trends and patterns of TI political activity, and with
almost 800 publications now based on these documents [3] it is
increasingly difficult for public health advocates and policymakers
to learn from the research findings. Only two studies have
reviewed elements of this literature systematically [1,4], and none
have attempted to develop taxonomies where industry tactics and
arguments can be assessed and systematically categorised in a way
that could be applied to other areas of public health involving
corporate interests.
This paper therefore aims to both systematically review the
existing literature on strategies used by the TI to influence
regulation aimed at restricting the marketing of tobacco products,
and to develop taxonomies for categorising the tactics and
arguments used. By providing a summary of industry actions in
this area, this review is likely to be a valuable resource for
enhancing the ability of public health advocates and policymakers
to understand, predict, and potentially counter tactics the TI
might use to exert influence on policy and the types of arguments it
is most likely to make when it does. This is particularly important
given that multiple Articles of the World Health Organisation’s
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) make
recommendations regarding the marketing of tobacco products,
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for example Article 13 recommends a ‘‘comprehensive ban on
advertising, promotion and sponsorship’’ [5]. The FCTC covers
87.4% of the world’s population [6], but despite the vast majority
of states becoming Party to the FCTC many have yet to
implement its recommendations [7] with the tactics of the TI
identified as a hindrance to the development and implementation
of legislation [8]. Existing research shows that despite TI claims
that marketing is only used for brand switching and capturing
market share, there is a significant link between TI marketing and
smoking initiation among young people and increased smoking
prevalence [9,10,11,12,13,14,15]. This underpins the continuing
importance of understanding the strategies the TI use to shape
policies aimed at regulating the marketing of tobacco products
which kill half of their long-term users [16,17].
Methods
This review aimed to identify all articles that examined TI
attempts to influence marketing regulation from 1990 to 2013 (see
Protocol S1). Marketing encompasses five key variables: product,
promotion, price, place, and person [18]. However as a systematic
review of TI influence on tobacco tax has already been completed
[1], we excluded price in the form of tax from this review.
The databases Web of Knowledge (which includes Web of
Science, BIOSIS Previews, and MEDLINE), Business Source
Premier, and Embase were searched using the search string:
(corporat* OR industr* OR compan* OR busines* OR firm*) AND (tobacco
OR smok* OR cigarette*) AND (marketing OR advertis* OR sponsor*) AND
(regulat* OR policy OR legislat*). The search engine Google was used
to identify grey literature, the UCSF Tobacco Documents
‘Marketing and Advertising’ Bibliography [19] was searched for
additional academic articles, the series of UCSF US State tobacco
reports [20] were assessed, and experts were contacted to identify
any additional papers (more information is available in Appendix
S1). All searches were conducted between April and July 2011,
and were updated in March 2013. Searches were limited to articles
from 1990 to 2013 and those written in English. The search
protocol was developed in conjunction with a qualified librarian.
Initial study inclusion/exclusion criteria were discussed exten-
sively between all three authors, piloted and re-piloted. The final
inclusion/exclusion criteria used in this review can be seen in Box
S1. In total 1754 articles were identified, of which 1326 were
excluded based on their title and abstract alone. 418 articles were
downloaded for full analysis (10 articles could not be located
despite efforts to contact the authors). 370 articles were excluded
for not meeting the inclusion criteria. The remaining 48 articles
met all of the inclusion criteria.
Data extraction (Appendix S1 provides a summary) was
undertaken by the lead author, and a random sample of 24
(50%) of the included articles were second-reviewed by both the
second and third authors to check that all the inclusion criteria
were met and to agree final tactic and argument categorisation. All
differences were discussed between all three authors. Disagree-
ments related only to categorisation, more often in relation to the
categorisation of arguments than tactics. Where disagreement
occurred, all evidence falling under that particular category was
re-reviewed by all three authors until agreement had been
reached. Narrative synthesis was undertaken to combine the
evidence from the articles.
Taxonomies
This review splits TI political activity into ‘strategies’ which
include individual ‘tactics’ (the methods by which a corporation
attempts to exert influence) and ‘frames’ which include individual
‘arguments’ (the reasons given by a corporation as to why they
oppose one idea or support another).
Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) paper [21] was used as the basis for
the initial categorisation of TI strategies/tactics as it is the most
widely cited attempt to analytically categorise the tactics used by
corporations attempting to influence policy. Their system of
classification, based on resource dependence and market exchange
theory, assumes that corporate political activity represents one side
of an exchange relationship in which corporations offer policy-
makers support and information in return for influencing policy.
They identify three ‘long-term’ political strategies (information
strategy, financial incentive strategy, and constituency-building
strategy) which each contain multiple ‘short-term’ tactics. While
they claim their list is a ‘‘comprehensive taxonomy of specific
political strategies’’ [21], it preceded the TI document literature
which, given the uniqueness of the resource, is arguably the richest
literature available on industry political influence. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, therefore, we identified additional strategies and
tactics that were not included within their categorisation.
Hillman and Hitt’s [21] categorisation did not consider the
frames or arguments used by Industry, and so we developed a
second categorisation to take account of this. Frames offer a way of
‘‘packaging’’ an issue [22], they provide a ‘‘summary message for a
defined topic area’’ [23] and may contain several arguments that
share a common perspective [22,23]; in other words, frames are
the ‘‘meta-message’’ [24]. Many papers, within tobacco
[22,23,25,26,27,28,29,30] and other areas [31,32,33,34], have
shown that how an argument or issue is framed is important for its
success and how it is perceived. It was therefore deemed important
for this review to categorise both the arguments the TI uses, and
the broader frames in which they fit. There is no consensus in the
literature about the naming of frames.
We initially developed our list of strategies/tactics and frames/
arguments via ‘a priori coding’ [35], the former adapted from
Hillman and Hitt [21] and the latter based on the limited existing
literature on TI frames [26,28]. Additional categories were added
via ‘emergent coding’ [35] following review of the papers included
and after extensive discussions between all three authors. This was
an iterative process and the taxonomies were only finalised after all
of the papers had been reviewed as described above (detailed
descriptions of the strategies and frames are available in Appendix
S1).
Categorisation
In this paper the tactics and arguments used by the TI were
categorised using the taxonomies outlined above. We then counted
the number of times each was used. If a tactic or argument was
referred to more than once (in one or multiple articles) regarding
the same policy then it was only counted once, however if it was
referred to more than once about different policies then this was
counted separately. While the tactics and arguments counted will
be influenced by both the focus of the included articles (and any
bias therein) and our framework of categorisation, counting was
deemed the best way of obtaining an indication, albeit crude, of
which tactics and arguments are relied upon most heavily by the
TI.
The geography of where each tactic and argument was used was
also identified. If the article included was transnational, wherever
possible the geography of where the individual tactics and
arguments were used was listed. For example, the article by
ASH [36] is a transnational study but the tactic ‘indirect lobbying’
was used in the UK (Europe).
A Systematic Review of Tobacco Industry Influence
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Results
Geography
In total 48 articles that mentioned arguments and tactics used
by the TI when attempting to influence marketing regulation were
included within this review. Over half (56%) of the articles
focussed on activity in North America, Europe or Australasia, 17%
focussed on Asia (Table 1). Only one article focussed on activity in
Africa, but one ‘transnational’ study [37] also made references to
TI arguments used when countering regulations proposed in
Africa.
Tactics and Arguments
The TI uses a number of recurring tactics (Table 2) and
arguments (Table 3) when attempting to influence marketing
regulation.
TI tactics used to influence marketing regulation. This
review identified 18 separate tactics (Table 2) falling under six
main strategies: ‘Information’ (providing or manipulating evi-
dence), ‘Constituency building’ (forming alliances with other
sectors, organisations, or the public to give the impression of
larger support for the industry’s position), ‘Policy substitution’
(proposing or supporting alternative policies), ‘Legal’ (using the
legal system), ‘Constituency fragmentation, and destabilization’
(weakening opponents), and ‘Financial incentive’ (offering direct or
indirect monetary incentives); further details included in Appendix
S1.
The strategies ‘Constituency fragmentation’ and ‘Financial
incentive’ were documented least frequently and each only in a
single geographic region (North America and Europe respectively).
The other strategies were widely used, although two individual
tactics were only documented in single jurisdictions: pre-emption
(Legal strategy) was only seen in the USA, although used in
multiple states; and the preparation of position papers/technical
reports (Information strategy) was only seen in the European
Union. A further Information tactic, establishing collaboration
with or working alongside policymakers, was only identified in
Europe but within two jurisdictions.
A variety of Information strategies were identified and widely
used. These include direct [36,37,38,43,45,46,48,51,52,53,
54,63,65,70,71,74,76,77,81,82] and indirect [36,37,52,53,54,
58,61,68,71] lobbying of policymakers, attempting to shape the
evidence via commissioning research [36,37,47,48,51,53,71] or
preparing technical reports [53,54], and efforts to establish
collaboration with policymakers [51,54]. When lobbying directly
the TI often identifies and targets specific politicians, hoping that
they will act on their behalf in policy discussions; this was seen in
the UK [36,53], Uzbekistan [45], Australia [48], the EU [54], and
the USA where there was evidence that legislators have lobbied on
the industry’s behalf [58,68]. There was also evidence that the TI
lobby domestic political actors to represent their interests in other
countries; for example in 1992 when plain packaging was
proposed in Australia, the TI ‘‘approached the vice-consul
(commercial) of the British Consul General in Sydney’’ in order
to ask for assistance from the UK government in dealing with the
Australian government [37].
The use of indirect lobbying, where the TI’s interests are often
hidden behind front groups or allies from other industry sectors or
trade organisations, was also frequent. Evidence from only Europe
and North America may reflect the loss of TI credibility in these
regions and hence its need to use third parties, or it may simply
reflect the research base. Examples illustrate the range of contexts
in which this tactic was used. When opposing the UK’s Tobacco
Advertising Bill in 2000, for example, the TI ‘‘encouraged a range
of other organisations’’ to lobby the government on their behalf,
these included the British Brands Group, the Association of
Convenience Stores, and the Advertising Association [36], the TI
again involved similar front groups when plain packaging was
discussed in the UK in 2008 [36]. When the use of new health
warnings was proposed in Australia in 1991, the TI, through a
lobbyist, gained the support of third parties such as the Business
Council of Australia, the Confederation of Australian Industry, the
media, unions, advertising organisations, and growers and
suppliers [48]. And when the European Community sought to
end all tobacco advertising in member states in the 1990s, ‘‘PM
[Philip Morris] sought to preserve Denmark’s opposition to the
ban though the creation of the Committee for Freedom of
Commercial Expression’’ which was ‘‘managed at arm’s length’’
and recruited more than 50 prominent Danes including a leading
lawyer, a leading Danish writer and philosopher, and a well-
known architect [53].
Attempts to shape the evidence base were also identified as a key
element of the TI’s information strategy [36,37,47,48,51,
53,54,71]. For example, in order to counter the EC directive banning
tobacco advertising and sponsorship, the TI commissioned two ‘‘separate but
complementary projects’’ through the Adam Smith Institute in London which
were to argue against the ban in the ‘‘context of a host of proposals which
progressively restrict personal freedom’’ [53]. When plain packaging was
suggested in Canada, the TI developed a common strategy and
created the ‘Plain Packs Bible’ as a ‘‘resource for … the industry
and allied groups who need to put the industry’s case in public’’
Table 1. Geographical location of TI activity.
Geographical Location Number of articles (%) Articles
Africa 1 (2%) Africa [38]
Asia 8 (17%) Philippines [39]; Malaysia [40]; Japan [41]; Cambodia [42]; Lebanon [43]; China [44]; Uzbekistan1
[45]; Middle East [46]
Australasia 3 (6%) Australia [47] [48]; New Zealand [49]
Europe 5 (10%) Switzerland [50]; Hungary [51]; Czech Republic [52]; European Union [53] [54]
North America 19 (40%) USA [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60] [61] [62] [63] [64] [65] [66] [67] [68] [69] [70] [71] [72] [73]
South America 4 (8%) Argentina [74]; Uruguay [75]; Latin America [76] [77]
Transnational 8 (17%) Transnational [36] [78] [79] [80] [81] [37] [82] [83]
Total 48
1Different official bodies class Uzbekistan as either a Central Asian or European country. We have categorised it as Asian, as per the UN [84].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0087389.t001
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and something that would be ‘‘accessible for civil servants and
politicians’’ [36].
External Constituency Building was often linked to indirect
lobbying because the TI both creates front groups or astroturf
organisations to lobby on its behalf [51,53,60], or forms alliances
with and mobilises existing organisations [36,37,46,48,51,52,53,
54,60,61,63,66,68,71,76,77]. For example, PM was able to
cultivate and create allies to support the TI by contributing
financially to women’s organisations in the USA; when a bill
further restricting television advertising was proposed, American
Women in Radio and Television wrote letters to Congress
opposing the ban ‘‘out of gratitude’’ for PM’s support [61].
Internal Constituency Building (collaboration among manufac-
turers) was also common and cut across different policies and
jurisdictions [36,37,40,47,48,51,54,76,77,81]. This review suggests
it occurs when the TI is facing a major regulatory threat, for
example it was reported in TI attempts to combat the introduction
of plain packaging in Canada [36], the FCTC globally [81], and
the European Tobacco Products Directive (TPD) [54].
Table 2. Tactics used by the TI when attempting to influence marketing regulation.
Strategy (number of times
identified) Tactic Number of times identified, by geography
Information (44) Direct lobbying (meetings and correspondence with
legislators/policymakers)
23 : Africa –1 [38]; Asia –3 [45] [43] [46]; Australasia –2 [48] [37];
Europe –7 [36] [36] [54] [53] [53] [51] [52]; N.America –6 [65] [71] [63] [70]
[37] [82]; S.America –3 [77] [76] [74]; Transnational –1 [81]
Indirect lobbying (using third parties, including
front groups, to lobby on the industry’s behalf)
10 : Europe –5 [36] [36] [54] [53] [52]; N.America –5 [58] [68] [71] [61]
[37]
Shaping the evidence
base
Commissioning, writing (or
ghost writing), or disseminating
research/publications1
7 : Australasia –2 [47] [48]; Europe –2 [53] [51]; N.America –3 [71] [36]
[37]
Preparing position papers,
technical reports or data on impacts
(including economic impact studies)
2 : Europe –2 [54] [53]
Establishing industry/policymaker collaboration (e.g. via
working group, technical group, advisory group)/work
alongside policymakers providing technical support/advice
2 : Europe –2 [54] [51]
Constituency building (42) External constituency
building
Form alliances with and
mobilise other industry sectors/
business/trade organisations
15 : Asia –1 [46]; Australasia –1 [48]; Europe –5 [36] [53] [53] [52] [51];
N.America –6 [68] [60] [71] [63] [66] [37]; S.America –2 [77] [76]
Media advocacy (press releases,
publicity campaigns, public
hearings, interviews)
7 : Europe –3 [50] [54] [53]; N.America –4 [71] [37] [82] [83]
Form alliances with or mobilize
unions/civil society organizations/
consumers/employees/the public
6 : Australasia –1 [48]; Europe –3 [54] [53] [53]; N.America –2 [60] [61]
Creation of front groups
or astroturf organisations2
3 : Europe –2 [53] [51]; N.America –1 [60]
Internal constituency
building
Collaboration between companies/
development of pan-industry
group or industry trade association3
11 : Asia –1 [40]; Australasia –2 [47] [48]; Europe –3 [36] [54] [51];
N.America –2 [36] [37]; S.America –2 [77] [76]; Transnational –1 [81]
Policy substitution4 (32) Develop/promote (new or existing) voluntary code/self-
regulation
18 : Asia –7 [40] [45] [41] [42] [43] [44] [46]; Australasia –1 [47]; Europe –
5 [36] [50] [53] [52] [51]; N.America –2 [55] [62]; S.America –2 [77] [76];
Transnational –1 [81]
Develop/promote alternative regulatory policy5 8 : Asia –1 [46]; Australasia –1 [48]; Europe –1 [53]; N.America –2 [71]
[64]; S.America –2 [77] [74]; Transnational –1 [83]
Develop/promote non-regulatory initiative (generally seen
to be ineffective/less effective, e.g. education programmes)
6 : Africa –1 [38]; Asia –1 [46]; N.America –1 [83]; S.America –2 [76]
[74]; Transnational –1 [81]
Legal (15) Pre-emption 6 : N.America –6 [55] [69] [70] [63] [64] [66]
Using litigation/threat of legal action 9 : Africa –2 [37] [37]; Asia –1 [39]; Australasia –1 [48]; Europe –2 [54]
[79]; N.America –3 [57] [60] [72]
Constituency fragmentation
and destabilization (2)
Preventing the emergence of, neutralising and/or discrediting
potential opponents (individuals, organisations or coalitions)
2 : N.America –2 [71] [61]
Financial Incentive (2) Providing current or offering future employment
to those in influential role
1 : Europe –1 [53]
Gifts, entertainment or other direct financial inducement 1 : Europe –1 [52]
1Including research/publications intended to undermine or misrepresent existing evidence.
2Creation of group for specific purpose of working against proposed policy.
3Routine use of a trade association was not counted, industry collaboration had to be ‘active’.
4Includes efforts to prevent the implementation of ‘anticipated’ policies.
5In some cases, industry uses legislators to promote their alternative policies.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0087389.t002
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The use of policy substitution also appears to be a key strategy used
toprevent theimplementationofmarketingregulations,andhasbeen
documented globally. Most frequently the TI proposes the imple-
mentation of voluntary regulation in place of formal legislation
[36,40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47,50,51,52,53,55,62,76,77,81]. This
tactic is designed to reduce political pressure to formally regulate
(which is attractive to policymakers, mostly due to cost), and to pre-
emptpoliticalaction.Forexample,whenfacedwithabanonalldirect
and indirect advertising in Malaysia, the TI created a voluntary code
entitled ‘Code for the Marketing of Cigarettes’ [40], and similarly in
Australia Philip Morris International (PMI) developed their own
marketing code of practice specifically intended to be used ‘‘in
lobbying, to gain a public relations advantage by promoting PMI as
responsible towards youth’’ [47]. Voluntary regulation has also been
proposed by the TI, and in some cases implemented, in the USA
[55,62], Japan [41], Cambodia [42], Lebanon [43], China [44],
Hungary [51], Czech Republic [52], UAE [46], and Switzerland
[50], and has also been suggested when the risk of regulatory
intervention is transnational [53,76,77,81].
Similarly, the TI often develops or promotes non-regulatory
initiatives, such as youth education programmes, in order to avoid
more formal legislation and appear socially responsible
[38,46,74,76,81,83]. For example, when opposing the FCTC
restrictions on marketing, the TI saw youth access schemes as a
way to ‘‘make a significant gesture that would divert attention
from the FCTC, moderate the WHO’s moves toward the FCTC,
and bring the tobacco companies together against the FCTC’’
[81]. Much research shows TI-funded educational campaigns are
ineffective [83,85], and often counterproductive [85,86].
Table 3. Arguments used by the TI when attempting to influence marketing regulation.
Frame (number of times identified) Argument
Number of times identified, by
geography
Negative
Unintended
Consequences
(32)
Economic (21) Manufacturers (10) The cost of compliance for manufacturers
will be high/the time required for implementation
has been underestimated
6 : Australasia –2 [48] [49]; Europe –2 [54]
[79]; N.America –1 [65]; Transnational –1
[78]
Regulation will result in financial or job losses
(among manufacturers)
3 : Asia –1 [45]; Europe –1 [54]; N.America
–1 [37]
The regulation is discriminatory/regulation will
not affect all producers/customers equally
1 : Europe –1 [54]
Public Revenue (7) Regulation will cause economic/financial problems (for
city, state, country or economic area (e.g. European Union))
7 : Asia –2 [45] [46]; Europe –2 [54] [51];
N.America –3 [65] [67] [36]
Associated
industries (4)
Regulation will result in financial or job losses (among
retailers and other associated industries, e.g. printing,
advertising, leisure)
4 : Australasia –1 [49]; Europe –1 [54];
N.America –2 [67] [66]
Public Health (4) Regulation will have negative public health
consequences
4 : Australasia –1 [48]; N.America –2 [36]
[37]; Transnational –1 [80]
Illicit Trade1 (2) Regulation will cause an increase in illicit trade 2 : N.America –2 [36] [37]
Other (5) Regulation could have other negative unintended
consequences (e.g. cause confusion amongst customers, set
a precedent for other types of products/’slippery slope’)
5 : Africa –1 [37]; Australasia –1 [49];
N.America –2 [71] [36]; Transnational –1
[78]
Legal (30) Infringes legal rights of company (trademarks,
intellectual property, constitutionally protected
free speech (e.g. US First Amendment), international
trade agreements)
20 : Africa –2 [37] [37]; Asia –3 [36] [37] [37];
Australasia –3 [48] [37] [37]; Europe –5 [36]
[36] [54] [37] [37]; N.America –4 [36] [56] [37]
[37]; S.America –1 [75]; Transnational –2
[80] [37]
Regulation is more extensive than
necessary/regulation is disproportionate
4 : Australasia –1 [48]; Europe –1 [54];
N.America –1 [37]; Transnational –1 [80]
Body doesn’t have the power to regulate/it’s
beyond their jurisdiction
4 : Europe –2 [54] [53]; N.America –2 [57]
[37]
Regulation will cause an increase in compensation claims 2 : Australasia –1 [37]; N.America –1 [37]
Regulatory Redundancy (13) Industry adheres to own self-regulation
codes/self-regulation is working well
5: Asia –1 [45]; Australasia –1 [47];
N.America –2 [59] [83]; Transnational –1
[81]
Industry only markets to those of legal age/is
actively opposed to minors using product
4 : Asia –1 [44]; N.America –2 [58] [59];
Transnational –1 [81]
Existing regulation is satisfactory/existing regulation is
satisfactory, but requires better enforcement
4 : Europe –1 [54]; N.America –3 [58] [59]
[73]
Insufficient Evidence (11) There’s insufficient evidence that the proposed policy
will work/marketing doesn’t cause or change behaviour
(it’s only used for brand selection and capturing market
share), so regulation will have no effect
10 : Asia –2 [45] [44]; Australasia –4 [47]
[48] [49] [78]; Europe –1 [54]; N.America –2
[36] [59]; Transnational –1 [80]
The health impacts of consumption remain unproven 1 : Asia –1 [45]
1‘Illicit Trade’ is separate as it both undermines public health policy and has economic consequences.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0087389.t003
A Systematic Review of Tobacco Industry Influence
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 February 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 2 | e87389
The third policy substitution tactic identified is the development
or promotion of an alternative regulatory policy to the one being
proposed that is less effective and more favourable to their business
interests [46,48,53,64,71,74,77,83]. For example, in Australia,
when new health warnings were proposed in 1991, the TI decided
that their best chance of minimising their effect was to support the
adoption of the (weaker) European health warnings then being
used, rather than those suggested by the Australian Ministerial
Council on Drugs Strategy, as the European warnings were at the
bottom of the pack and comparatively small [48]. And, when the
European Community proposed a ban on tobacco advertising, the
TI in Germany worked with the German government to
‘‘introduce a weak proposal designed to replace the proposed,
stronger EC advertising ban’’ [53]. It was drafted by TI officials
and was meant to be submitted to the EC through German
representatives without acknowledging its true origin [53].
Using or threatening legal action against a proposed regulation
was commonly used and seen globally [37,39,48,54,57,60,72,79],
for example it was used multiple times when packaging regulations
were proposed [37,39,72,79]. It is typically used once other tactics
have failed, and reinforces industry arguments about the high costs
of regulation and the immediate fiscal advantage of policies
(notably self-regulation) promoted by the industry. The TI was
also seen attempting to use legal action to suppress an individual
opposition organisation [48]. The second legal tactic, pre-emption,
was only documented in the US but occurred in multiple states. It
was found to have been used when the TI was arguing against
youth access restrictions [55,63,64,70], and in some cases more
specifically against vending machines restrictions [66,69].
TI arguments used to influence marketing
regulation. This review identified 17 separate arguments
(Table 3), which were grouped into four main frames: ‘Negative
Unintended Consequences’ (direct and indirect compliance costs
(monetary and other)), ‘Legal’ (illegality of the policy (the implicit
cost for government)), ‘Regulatory Redundancy’ (policy is
unnecessary), and ‘Insufficient Evidence’ (policy is not based on
sound evidence); further details included in Appendix S1. The
‘Negative Unintended Consequences’ and ‘Legal’ frames were the
most commonly used.
While all of the frames were seen across a wide range of
geographic areas, again highlighting the cross-national nature of
TI political activity, three arguments within these frames were only
used in one jurisdiction: ‘‘Regulation will cause an increase in illicit
trade’’ was only identified as having been used in the USA [36,37];
the argument that ‘the regulation is discriminatory’ was only
identified as having been used once in Europe in relation to the
TPD [54]; and the argument that ‘the health impacts of smoking
remain unproven’ was only identified in Uzbekistan [45].
A large number of arguments focused on the negative
unintended consequences of legislation. These included claims of
economic losses to tobacco manufacturers (both compliance costs
and job losses) [37,45,48,49,54,65,78,79], associated industries
[49,54,66,67], and the public revenue [36,45,46,51,54,65,67].
Such arguments sometimes involve exaggerated claims, for
example it was claimed that a ban on advertising in Uzbekistan
would lead to ‘‘the immediate demise of the domestic cigarette
industry’’ [45]. There are a wide variety of other arguments in this
frame, including the claim that the proposed regulation will have
negative public health consequences [36,37,48,80]. For example
the TI argued that plain packaging in Canada would ‘‘make
cigarettes cheaper and more available to youth’’ [37] and new
warning labels in Australia would lead to ‘‘warning overload’’
causing consumers to ‘‘ignore warning labels entirely’’ [48].
Arguments questioning the legality of policies to curb TI
marketing (legal frame) are very common and aim to shift the
focus of the debate away from public health and consumer
protection, aiming instead to highlight the potential administrative
costs of new policies. The argument that a proposed policy
contravenes the TI’s legal rights has been widely used to fight a
variety of public health policies including the regulation of
packaging (health warnings and plain packaging)
[36,37,48,75,80], product descriptors (such as ‘light’ or ‘mild’)
[36,37], and advertising bans [37,56]. Such arguments frequently
claim that public health measures are incompatible with trade law.
For example FCTC proposals to remove product descriptors were
met with TI arguments that the words were part of a trademark
and therefore the proposed regulation would violate TRIPS and
the Paris Convention [37] and in Uruguay PM alleged that plain
packaging regulations would violate a Switzerland-Uruguay
bilateral investment treaty [75]. Such arguments are made despite
growing evidence that they are misplaced (see below).
Other arguments falling within the legal frame involve
exaggerated and emotive claims such that regulation is ‘‘extreme’’,
‘‘disproportionate’’ (PM on plain packaging [80]), or ‘‘excessive’’
(the TI on pack health warnings in Canada [37]), or a
manifestation of ‘‘nanny state’’ tendencies (as per Australia’s
approach to health warnings [48]). These claims relate to broader
libertarian arguments about the appropriate level of state
intervention and regulation. In Europe, the TI has argued that
the EU’s powers do not extend to regulating on public health, and
the issue is instead one for individual Member States [53,54], and
similarly in North America the TI has argued that regulation is
‘‘beyond federal jurisdiction’’ [37] and that ‘‘the Constitution
prohibits any one state from regulating avenues of national
commerce’’ [57]. Although the argument that the proposed
regulation will lead to an increase in compensation claims was only
identified twice [37], the threat of the cost of litigation underlies all
of these legal arguments.
Arguments that the regulation is unnecessary (regulatory
redundancy frame) were also frequently used. These claims took
a variety of forms including that the TI is opposed to youth
smoking and does not market to youth [44,58,59,81], and that
they can be trusted to comply with voluntary regulations and that
existing voluntary initiatives work [45,47,59,81,83]. In some
instances the TI suggested that existing regulation was sufficient
or simply needed better enforcement [54,58,59,73]. In all cases the
overarching message was that further regulation was unnecessary.
Questioning the strength of evidence [36,44,45,47,48,49,
54,59,78,80] (insufficient evidence frame) favourable to public
health policies is a common technique that has been used, for
example, to oppose the introduction of plain packaging (in New
Zealand [78], Canada [36], and transnationally [80]) and raise
doubts about the impact of TI advertising on consumer behaviour
[45,47,59]. This argument, along with others, is used to increase
scepticism about the likely benefits of regulation and reinforce
other arguments the TI makes.
There are major doubts over the accuracy of almost all of the
arguments identified in this taxonomy. For example, asserting that
plain packaging violates trademarks under World Trade Organi-
sation (WTO) rules ignores the distinction made between
registration and use under TRIPS and the Paris Convention
[87]. There is no provision within WTO rules that requires
‘‘WTO Members to grant the owner of a registered trademark, an
affirmative right to actually ‘use’ that mark’’ [87]. Moreover,
members are granted ‘‘significant flexibility in enacting public
health measures’’ when it’s necessary to protect ‘‘human, animal
or plant life or health’’ [87]. While the US First Amendment
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provides extensive protection to freedom of speech, it has been
argued that ‘‘protecting the public health may necessitate stringent
limits on commercial expression’’ [88] therefore allowing some
speech to be restricted for the good of the public’s health. In
Europe and North America where the TI have argued that the
regulation falls outside of EU or federal jurisdiction is also false,
and its attempts to overturn regulation on this basis have failed
[54]. Additionally, arguing that there is no evidence that
regulating marketing works has also been found to be false. Much
research has found a significant link between advertising and
smoking behaviour [9,10,11,12,13,14,15], including evidence of a
relationship between exposure to smoking in films and adolescent
smoking [89,90,91].
Discussion
This systematic review suggests that the TI uses a relatively
narrow range of strategies/tactics and frames/arguments when
attempting to influence marketing regulation, albeit a wider range
than suggested by existing taxonomies of corporate political
activity. This review also suggests that TI political activity is not
geographically specific, with strategies/tactics and frames/argu-
ments being used across a wide variety of jurisdictions. Conse-
quently the taxonomies developed within this paper are likely to be
helpful in understanding TI political activity internationally.
Taxonomies
Hillman and Hitt’s [21] framework, on which the categorisation
of tactics in this review was initially based, considerably under-
represents the range of tactics that the TI uses when attempting to
influence policy. This may reflect both the unprecedented number
of regulatory risks facing this particular industry and that their
categorisation was developed prior to the release of internal TI
documents. Furthermore Hillman and Hitt’s [21] taxonomy was
based on exchange theory which assumes that corporate political
activity represents one side of an exchange relationship in which
corporations offer policymakers support and information in return
for influencing policy. While the relevance of this approach is now
arguably more limited with the advent of the FCTC’s Article 5.3
(which aims to protect public health policies from the ‘‘vested
interests of the tobacco industry’’ [92]), this will not necessarily
reduce the TI’s ability to influence policy but simply require them
to do so less directly. The frequency with which the TI relies on
third parties highlights the weakness of exchange theory-based
models of corporate political activity. We also identified tactics/
strategies that sit outside of exchange theory (such as constituency
fragmentation, the threat of litigation, and ineffective forms of self-
regulation) which challenges the assumption that corporate
political activity is designed to produce outcomes that are mutually
beneficial to corporations and policymakers, and we show that the
information and arguments the TI uses are highly misleading;
findings which suggest the original model may be both limited and
naı¨ve.
Although it appears that the TI uses a number of discrete
arguments within a narrow range of frames, many of them fall
within a larger ‘cost-benefit’ meta-frame which promotes the
economic and social costs of proposed public health policies and
underplays their benefits. This approach is highly relevant to
current policymaking which embeds stakeholder consultation and
impact assessments within the process of policy formation. It has
previously been shown that the TI successfully lobbied for the
introduction of impact assessments in Europe (impact assessments
using a cost-benefit approach in which the impacts of policies are
monetised) because it felt that this system would work to its
advantage and make it harder for public health policies to be
implemented [93]. This is also supported by the related literature
[94] which shows how impact assessment, notably cost benefit
analysis, can serve to assist corporate interests. Arguments such as
‘the cost of compliance will be high’, ‘the regulation is more
extensive than necessary’ and those under the ‘negative unintend-
ed consequences’ frame are used to increase scepticism about the
likely benefits of regulation, and highlight the potential future costs
for industry, retailers, and the public through the wasting of public
funds on unnecessary policy formation, discussion and implemen-
tation. This is also observed through the omission of a ‘health’
frame [95]; this review found no evidence of the TI making
reference to the dangers of smoking, although it did find an
example of the TI refuting the relationship between smoking and
disease as late as 1994 in Uzbekistan [45].
Finally we note that there is some overlap in the tactics and
arguments used by the TI. For example, there is both a legal
strategy and a legal frame, the policy substitution strategy overlaps
with the regulatory redundancy frame (especially, for example, the
tactic ‘develop/promote voluntary code/self-regulation’ and
argument ‘industry adheres to own self-regulation’), and many of
the arguments within the negative unintended consequences frame
are linked to efforts in constituency building. This highlights how
the tactics and arguments used by the TI are mutually reinforcing.
Strengths and Limitations
This review has a number of limitations. First, although a broad
search strategy and search string was used when initially
identifying articles it is still possible that some relevant articles
may have been missed and therefore not included within the
review. To minimise this, we worked with a librarian, searched
online research repositories, and contacted experts in the field to
identify additional articles. Second, the coding of arguments and
tactics within the articles is often subjective. To mitigate this, all
three authors reviewed and re-reviewed the coding at various
points during the systematic review process and, at the end,
collectively reviewed 50% of the included articles, plus all of those
in categories where coding concerns had been identified. Third,
the identification of tactics and arguments, and the jurisdictions in
which they are used, is dependent on the available literature, its
quality, and any publication bias. This in turn may depend on
limitations in the availability and nature of the TI documents on
which much of the literature is based. These issues have a number
of implications. For example, many of the articles included did not
focus primarily on TI attempts to influence marketing regulations
and thus only made brief references to TI tactics or arguments,
with little context or background. We attempted to overcome this
limitation by requiring each tactic and argument to be supported
by verifiable evidence. Information regarding the success or failure
of a particular policy proposal was not always recoded, making it
impossible to reliably determine which tactics or arguments were
most successful in defeating marketing-related regulations. Fur-
thermore, it is highly likely that some of the tactics and arguments
were used more frequently by the TI than identified within the
literature. For example, financial incentives are likely to be used
more frequently and broadly than the two occasions identified in
Europe [52,53], we know that the TI frequently attempts to
discredit their opponents (see for example [96,97,98,99]), however
this tactic was only found to have been used twice within the
included literature [61,71], and similarly, arguments that market-
ing regulations will increase illicit tobacco are more commonly
used, and in more jurisdictions, than this review would suggest
[100,101,102]. The limited appearance of some arguments, such
as tobacco not having been proven to cause disease (which was
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only identified as having been used by the TI in Uzbekistan in
1994 [45]), may reflect the fact that we only examined tactics and
arguments from 1990 onwards. In addition, we note that despite a
growing literature showing how the TI influences trade agree-
ments and then uses them to argue against the feasibility of
regulations [103,104], the use of trade agreements to pre-empt
marketing policy is not identified as a tactic (although we do
identify the use of trade agreements as an argument under the
‘legal’ frame). This is perhaps due to the focus of our search being
on the TI’s influence of marketing regulations which may,
therefore, have missed articles examining industry influence on
trade agreements that were in turn used to influence marketing
regulations. Due to our concerns regarding bias in the literature,
the counting element of this review should be used as a guideline
only to provide some insight into the most frequently used tactics
and arguments.
The main strength of this review is its systematic approach and
its attempt to rigorously categorise industry strategies/tactics and
frames/arguments; to our knowledge it is the first attempt to do so.
A key strength is the geographic diversity of the literature
reviewed. Although over half of the included articles (26 articles,
56%) focussed on North America, Europe or Australasia (perhaps
in large part due to grants provided by the US National Cancer
Institute for research on TI documents in the early 2000s), a
significant proportion did not, and the geographic base was far
more diverse than some previous reviews of industry tactics [1].
While some tactics and arguments were seen only in one or a few
jurisdictions, this sometimes appears to reflect limitations in the
underlying literature (see above), or specific jurisdictional issues for
example the use of pre-emption in the USA. While care needs to
be taken in assuming that tactics and arguments used in one
jurisdiction will be used elsewhere, this review suggests that the
findings will be broadly applicable across different geographies. It
is, however, also important to recognise that some arguments are
likely to be more effective in certain circumstances, for example
legal arguments may be more successful where government legal
expertise is undeveloped and the costs of litigation proportional to
government revenue are high [103].
Implications for Policy, Practice, and Research
This systematic review has identified common tactics and
arguments that the TI uses to prevent the implementation of
regulation, and has shown that they are repeatedly used across
different jurisdictions. Policymakers need to be aware of these in
order to understand how the TI may try to manipulate the
regulatory environment in their own interests, and public health
advocates can use this information to prepare effective counter
strategies. The recent failure of the British government to pursue
plain packaging legislation highlights the importance of such
knowledge.
Models of corporate political activity based on internal TI
documents represent a potentially valuable analytical tool with
which to examine opposition to public health policies and identify
low visibility activity. The repeated use of tactics and arguments
identified in this review underlines the potential of such an
approach. Further work is now needed to examine whether the
taxonomies for TI tactics and arguments developed in this paper
can be applied to other industries and policy areas. Further
research is also required to examine the interconnections between
strategies/tactics, frames/arguments and audiences, as different
social actors are likely to propagate different messages and have
different political effects. Finally, due to limitations in the included
literature, we also recommend that future research on corporate
influence should, where at all possible, include contextual
information, ensure all claims are supported by reliable and
verifiable evidence, and that the success or failure of individual
tactics and arguments are recorded.
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